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Recent Decisions
CIVIL RIGHTS-TITLE VII-EMPLOYEE SENIORITY-LAYOFFS-The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that
a collective bargaining contract provision for layoffs by reverse order
employment seniority is consistent with a coexisting conciliation
agreement for increased minority hiring which is silent respecting
overall seniority and with public policy enunciated by Title VII,
since a facially neutral plant-wide seniority system is bona fide
within the meaning of Title VII, section 703(h), notwithstanding
perpetuation of past discrimination.
Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d
687 (3d Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3111 (U.S.
Aug. 1, 1975) (No. 182).
Plaintiff Jersey Central Power & Light Company, a large public
utility operating in New Jersey, and defendant union' entered into
a collective bargaining agreement effective November 1, 1973
through October 31, 1975. The agreement continued the "last hired,
first fired" plant-wide seniority system2 currently in operation
1. All locals involved were members of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers. As of June 29, 1974, 2,877 of the company's 3,859 employees were in bargaining units
represented by these locals. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d
687, 694 (3d Cir. 1975).
2. A seniority system has been defined as
a set of rules governing job movements, including promotion, transfer, downgrading,
and layoff, in an employment unit. The most "senior" man among a group of compet-
ing workers is preferred, provided that he is qualified to fill the job in question and
that he is eligible to bid for it.
Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1260,
1263 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Incumbent Negro]. Such a system has been identified as
"competitive status seniority"; it can be distinguished from "fringe benefit seniority," which
concerns grants of employment benefits such as vacation and pension rights to workers on
the basis of length of service. Stacy, Title VII Seniority Remedies in a Time of Economic
Downturn, 28 VAND. L. REV. 487, 489-90 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Stacyl. For general
discussion and description of seniority systems see Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing
Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and
Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cooper]; Gould, Employment
Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How.
L.J. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Employment Security]; Developments in the
Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 1109, 1156-58 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
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among the bargaining unit employees: senior employees generally
would not be laid off before junior employees, and senior employees
whose jobs were eliminated could "bump" junior employees from
their positions.' Prior to the execution of the contract, a charge had
been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) alleging discrimination against certain minorities and
women by the company and the union in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 Subsequently, the company, union
and EEOC entered into a conciliation agreement effective Decem-
ber 3, 1973 through December 3, 1977.1 The agreement included an
"Competitive status seniority" may be measured by length of service in the entire plant or
within subdivisions of the plant. The former is known as plant-wide or employment seniority;
the latter is job, gang, progression line, craft or departmental seniority. Stacy, supra at 491.
3. The bargaining agreement expressly provided no senior employee should be terminated
if work he could reasonably perform was being done by a junior employee. Seniority would
be measured by length of service with the company. 508 F.2d at 696.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Title VII or the Actl.
Title VII declares it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire, to discharge or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions
or privileges of employment, or to deprive any individual of employment opportunities be-
cause of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Id. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), (2). Labor organiza-
tions are similarly proscribed from excluding or expelling from their membership, from with-
holding employment opportunities or from otherwise discriminating against protected
individuals. Id. §§ 2000e-2(c)(1), (2).
The EEOC is charged with the administration of the Act. Id. § 2000e-4(a). An aggrieved
individual may file a charge or charges may be filed by a member of the Commission who
has "reasonable cause to believe ... that an employer. . . or labor organization has engaged
in an unlawful employment practice." If an investigation shows reason to believe the charge
is true, the Commission must "endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." Id. § 2000e-5(a).
In Jersey Central, the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe the company had discrimi-
nated against minority group persons and women in hiring and job assignments, but withheld
decision on recruitment, training and promotion practices. There was likewise no decision
regarding union discrimination in representation, referral and membership practices. 508
F.2d at 694 & n.16.
5. The conciliation agreement required that the company make a reasonable effort to
recruit minorities in areas where they had been underutilized or not employed and where jobs
were to be filled by new hires. Recruited employees could get credit for experience gained in
a craft elsewhere, but wages, benefits, other conditions of employment and seniority dates
would be determined according to the collective bargaining agreement. The company was
obligated to maintain an affirmative action file of minority and female applicants, and was
to consult the file when job vacancies occurred which were to be filled by new hires. Ideally
the company would bring its minority and female workforce up to parity with the available
workforce within five years by using "best efforts" to hire minorities and females into each
job category. Brief for New Jersey AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 5-6, Jersey Cent. Power &
Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Amicus
Briefi. Qualified minorities and female incumbents would be given an opportunity to transfer
in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement as vacancies became available. 508
F.2d at 702.
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affirmative action plan, obligated the company to use its "best ef-
forts" to increase percentages of minority and female employees,
and contained no express seniority provision.'
Some months after the conciliation agreement became effective,
the company determined that economic conditions and financial
trends compelled a substantial layoff. The union demanded the
seniority provisions in the collective bargaining agreement should
govern the question of who would be terminated; the EEOC7 warned
that should the layoffs disproportionately affect newly hired minor-
ity employees, the company would be in violation of the conciliation
agreement and Title VII. Faced with overlapping and apparently
conflicting contractual obligations, the company and union submit-
ted to arbitration to ascertain whether the layoffs would violate
antidiscrimination provisions in the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The company also sought a declaratory judgment in federal
district court as to whether the collective bargaining contract or the
conciliation agreement should be followed in selecting employees for
layoff.'
In accordance with the arbitrator's decision, the company began
its layoff pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement; this de-
creased the percentage of minority representation among bargaining
unit employees Shortly thereafter, the district court ordered that
the layoffs proceed in a manner that would substantially preserve
6. During negotiations the EEOC advocated a seniority system which would give minority
and female employees greater seniority than they would actually accrue under the collective
bargaining contract. This proposal was not included in the final conciliation plan. 508 F.2d
at 695-96 n.20.
7. The United States General Service Administration (GSA) and the United States Office
of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) unofficially adopted the position that the proposed
layoffs would violate Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
508 F.2d at 696 n.24. These agencies were named as codefendants in the action because Jersey
Central had federal contracts subject to the equal opportunity requirements of the Executive
Order. The district court denied a motion to dismiss as to GSA and OFCC, but would not
preclude further action by the agencies pursuant to the Executive Order. Jersey Cent. Power
& Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 8 FEP Cases 959, 961 (D.N.J. 1974) (supplemental memo-
randum to the court's oral opinion).
8. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 8 FEP Cases 690 (D.N.J. 1974).
9. After the first week statistics indicated the layoffs had disproportionately affected
minority group employment. Of 176 employees identified for layoff,' 30.7% or 54 were minority
group persons and their percentage in the bargaining unit had decreased from 7.9% prior to
the institution of layoffs to 6.4% as of August 30, 1974. Among total company employees the
decrease was from 6.7% to 5.6%; by November 22, 1974, the layoff was expected to decrease
the proportion of minority group employees to 4.9%. 508 F.2d at 697 nn.28 & 29.
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the relative percentage of minorities in the workforce prior to the
layoffs.'" The court ruled the conciliation agreement could not be
frustrated by the bargaining contract and, since the two conflicted,
the conciliation agreement should prevail. Jersey Central utilized
the layoff method directed by the court until the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit stayed the order and expedited the appeal.
The circuit court initially considered whether there was an ex-
press or implied conflict between the bargaining and conciliation
agreements and if so, which contract should govern. If the contracts
did not conflict, the court would determine whether public policy
required modification of the bargaining agreement. Where provi-
sions in a second contract were clearly inconsistent with those of a
prior contract between the same parties, a novation would substi-
tute the second for the first." The court of appeals ruled the district
court's application of this principle was erroneous as a matter of law
because there was no express or implied inconsistency between the
two agreements with respect to layoffs. The conciliation agreement
intended to increase minority and female hiring;3 it did not explic-
itly authorize "artificial" seniority for those groups. Moreover, the
conciliation agreement meant to incorporate the existing seniority
10. The order required the creation of three seniority lists: one for minority employees,
one for white female employees, and one for "all other" employees. Jersey Cent. Power &
Light Co. v. Local 327,.IBEW, 8 FEP Cases 959, 960 (D.N.J. 1974).
The district court's power to modify or suspend the operation of a discriminatory seniority
system is not affected by the fact the system has been established through collective bargain-
ing. United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 454-55 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972). Under Title VII, the district court has broad power to fashion
an equitable remedy. See, e.g., Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 451 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1971) (court
possessed power to order reasonable adjustments in rights of white employees to protect and
redress the rights of discrimination victims).
11. 508 F.2d at 701-03 & n.44.
12. Id. at 700-02. Apparently, the court accepted the position of the New Jersey State
AFL-CIO, which argued that the conciliation agreement never purported to affect seniority
rights but was only concerned with hiring minorities. The "artificial" seniority urged by the
EEOC would adversely affect the expectations of other employees. Amicus Brief, supra note
5, at 9-10.
13. For example, § 3.9 of the conciliation agreement provided in pertinent part:
Respondent Company shall make a reasonable effort to recruit minorities and females
into those craft areas where such jobs are to be filled by new hires . . . . [I~n each
instance where a job is not to be filled from within, pursuant to the Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement and practice thereunder, reasonable efforts will be made to secure a
minority or female . . ..
508 F.2d at 701 (emphasis omitted). Additionally, the affirmative action provision imposed
an obligation on the company "to make every reasonable effort to bring its minority and
female workforce up to parity . . . as openings for new hires occur .... " Id.
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system rather than modify the labor contract.'" The EEOC had
argued that the "best efforts" clause of the conciliation agreement'
obligated the company to reflect in its workforce the racial, ethnic
and sexual composition of the labor market, even if this necessitated
modification of seniority provisions for certain purposes. Because
the conciliation agreement had only a hiring objective, however, the
company's "best efforts" obligation was not undone by layoffs insti-
tuted pursuant to contractual seniority.
Appellees had urged in the alternative that the collective bargain-
ing provision should be declared void as against public policy enun-
ciated in Title VII. 15 The court disagreed on the basis of its interpre-
tation of the Act's legislative history 7 and of section 703(h),' 8 which
14. The court implied this intent from § 4.2 of the conciliation contract, which provided:
[MIale minorities/females who are qualified and who had indicated the desire to
transfer shall be given the opportunity . . . using their total length of Company serv-
ice, subject to vacancies being available and in a manner consistent with the current
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Id. at 702 (emphasis omitted).
15. The company had agreed to use its "best efforts to hire into each of its job categories
minorities and/or females . . until such time as the minorities and/or females reach parity."
Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 6.
16. Congress articulated public policy with regard to employment discrimination in Title
VII. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). But see text accompanying notes
77-82 infra.
17. During congressional consideration of the Act there had been special concern that
Title VII would undermine seniority rights and would deny unions their representation rights
under the National Labor Relations Act and Railway Labor Act. Proponents of the Act replied
that the bill was not an instrument to abolish seniority or unions; it merely established that
race could not be used as a basis for discriminatory treatment. 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964)
(remarks of Senator Humphrey).
Senator Clark rebutted comments that the Act would adversely affect rights of labor with
a memorandum from the Department of Justice which stated in part:
Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes effect.
If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in the event of layoffs,
those who were hired last must be laid off first, such a provision would not be affected
in the least by title VII. This would be true even in the case where owing to discrimina-
tion prior to the effective date of the title, white workers had more seniority than
Negroes. Title VII is directed at discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. It is perfectly clear that when a worker is laid off or denied a chance
for promotion because under established seniority rules he is "low man on the totem
pole" he is not being discriminated against because of his race.
Id. at 7207 (reply to Senator Hill) [hereinafter cited as Justice Memorandum].
The floor managers of the House Bill submitted their view that:
Title VII would have no effect on established seiority rights. Its effect is prospective
and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminatory in the
past and as a result has an all-white working force, when the title comes into effect
the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a non-
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authorized the use of "bona fide" seniority systems. The court con-
cluded there was no per se violation of Title VII when minorities
were disproportionately affected in layoffs determined by plant-
wide seniority, since a facially neutral employment seniority system
fell within the statutory protection. In light of the legislative history
of Title VII, it was clear Congress did not intend to declare unlawful
all seniority systems which disadvantaged minorities and females. "
Finally, the court considered what evidence of discrimination
would be admissible on remand and would necessitate judicial mod-
ification of a facially neutral employment seniority system. The sole
challenge to the company's system had been that it carried forward
effects of past discrimination. In the court's opinion, Congress in-
tended a facially neutral plant-wide seniority system to be bona fide
within the meaning of the Act. Evidence of past discrimination was
without probative value in challenging a bona fide seniority system
even if effects of past discrimination were perpetuated by the pres-
ent layoff, because Congress chose to permit these systems despite
disproportionate effects. Only evidence on the neutrality of the sys-
tem or attempts to disguise present discrimination would be proba-
tive in a challenge to a plant-wide system. Judicial modification of
a prima facie neutral plant-wide system under any other circum-
stances would amount to preferential rather than remedial treat-
ment of minorities and women, and the clear thrust of Title VII's
discriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed, permitted-to fire whites
in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes
are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers
hired earlier.
Id. at 7213 (interpretative memorandum of Title Vn of H.R. 7152 submitted jointly by
Senators Clark and Case) [hereinafter cited as Clark Memorandum].
Subsequent to the above statements, a substituted bill was introduced which prohibited
preferential treatment and protected the bona fide seniority or merit system which was "not
the result of an intention to discriminate." See notes 18 & 20 infra. Senator Humphrey
observed that the new subsection authorized different treatment of employees under a senior-
ity, merit or other system which was not the result of an intention to discriminate. Humphrey
emphasized that the amendment did not narrow the application of the title, but merely
clarified its present intent and effect. Id. at 12,723 (Humphrey discusses miscellaneous
changes).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). Section 703(h) qualifies the proscriptions under Title
VII: it provides that an employer may apply different standards of compensation or different
terms, conditions or employment privileges "pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit sys-
tem, or a system which measures earnings by quality of production or to employees who work
in different locations," as long as the differences are not "the result of an intention to discrim-
inate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
19. 508 F.2d at 708.
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legislative history was against preferential treatment of any group.2'
Since Congress did not provide a remedy to alleviate perpetuated
effects of past discrimination in a facially neutral plant-wide senior-
ity system, the court refused to do so by judicial decree.2
The circuit court vacated the district court decision as it per-
tained to layoffs and remanded for any further proceedings required
to conform to its view on admissiblity of evidence. Judge Van Dusen
concurred in the judgment of the court but differed with the major-
ity's conclusion that evidence of past discrimination would not be
probative. He emphasized that rights conferred by Title VII were
not part of the bargaining process. In his view, Congress did not
intend that a facially neutral plant-wide system would automati-
cally be bona fide; hence both evidence of subjective intent to dis-
criminate and of continued effects of prior discriminatory acts
should be admissible against a plant-wide seniority system, and
either should be a sufficient basis for relief."
In Jersey Central, the Third Circuit joined an ongoing dispute
over whether Congress intended to exempt facially neutral plant-
wide seniority systems from the Title VII prohibitions even if they
disproportionately affected groups protected by the Act. The reme-
dial power of courts in the context of employment preferences and
decisions based on departmental, job, craft or other subdivided sen-
iority systems was no longer unsettled, -since earlier it had been
determined that these systems were not necessarily protected . 3
However, until the recent economic situation of inflation and low
productivity, plant or employment seniority remained the neutral
standard designated as bona fide. 4 Substantial industrial layoffs
precipitated by the economic downturn" brought to court for the
20. See note 17 supra. Section 703(j) states the Act doeb not require that an employer or
union grant preferential treatment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin
to correct an imbalance in the total number or percentages of one group as compared with
the group's percentage representation in the community, section, state or other area. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
21. 508 F.2d at 710.
22. Id. at 711 (Van Dusen, J., concurring).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 441 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 906 (1972) (in examination of class and craft seniority systems,
court recognized that pre-Act discriminatory conduct is highly relevant in considering neutral
practices alleged to carry forward past discriminatory effects).
24. E.g., Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). See text at notes 28-30 infra.
25. Stacy, supra note 2, at 487.
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first time, in Watkins v. USW Local 2369,26 a direct clash between
plant-wide or employment seniority and Title VII prohibitions.2 7
Like Jersey Central, Watkins involved a substantial cutback of
employees pursuant to a labor contract, with layoffs based on total
service and recalls based on reverse order seniority. Since Blacks
had only recently been hired in sizable numbers, the layoff necessar-
ily resulted in virtual elimination of the minority employee popula-
tion, with no reasonable prospects that subsequent recalls would
alleviate the adverse impact. The district court rejected dictum of
the Fifth Circuit in Local 189, Papermakers v. United States," a
case involving departmental seniority, in which the court suggested
an employment seniority system could not of itself perpetuate past
discrimination and that to hold otherwise would create fictional
seniority which the Act did not require.29 In Local 189 the court
.proposed that an employment or plant-wide seniority system was
26. 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975). The Fifth Circuit
recently reversed the district court, holding that Title VII did not prohibit the use of a plant-
wide seniority system to determine layoffs despite a disparate impact on minorities because
of earlier employment discrimination. The court deliberately limited its holding to instances
where present hiring practices had been nondiscriminatory for over ten years, the seniority
system was well-established and had been adopted without intent to discriminate, and the
individual employees who had suffered from the layoff had not been victims of the original
employment discrimination. 516 F.2d at 44-45. The Fifth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' conten-
tion that a facially neutral employment seniority system which affects Blacks dispropor-
tionately must be modified unless justified by business necessity because it "locked in"
effects of prior discrimination in a manner analogous to the invalidated systems in depart-
mental seniority cases. In the court' view, this argument was inapplicable because plaintiffs
in this lawsuit had individually attained their "rightful place" in the employee hierarchy. Age
rather than race was the principal ieason why the plaintiffs did not have sufficient seniority
to withstand layoff. During plaintiffs' working lifetimes the company had not allegedly prac-
ticed discrimination in hiring; since none of them had suffered "individual" discrimination,
no remedy was available. Despite its qualified holding, however, the court expressly agreed
with the legislative interpretation And results reached by the Third and Seventh Circuits
regarding protection of employment seniority systems. Id. at 45-46.
27. 369 F. Supp. at 1225.
28. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). In Local 189, the Fifth
Circuit held that a seniority system which gave priority to the worker with longest service in
a particular job and had a present discriminatory effect on Blacks due to prior exclusion from
certain jobs should be replaced by a system whereby progression would remain job-by-job,
but seniority would be determined by total length of employment rather than time served in
a particular job slot.
29. After determining that a subdivided seniority system could be judicially altered, the
court distinguished granting fictional seniority to newly hired Blacks from conferring equal
status to Blacks for time actually worked to remedy pre-Act discrimination. Fictional senior-
ity would not necessarily aid the actual victims of previous discrimination and would com-
prise preferential rather than remedial treatment. 416 F.2d at 995.
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bona fide and therefore protected under section 703(h) of Title VII;
the Watkins district court disagreed, and noted that legislative
statements concerning the protection of seniority systems had been
made prior to the introduction of section 703(h)30 and were not con-
trolling. The court concluded that a bona fide protected seniority
system must lack discrimination, including perpetuation of prior
discriminatory acts.
In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 3 the Seventh Circuit
adopted the Local 189 dictum and upheld as bona fide a seniority
system which embodied the "last hired, first fired" concept, despite
the employer's racially discriminatory hiring prior to the enactment
of Title VII. The Waters court determined that although the Act
mandated equal treatment of employees according to their earned
seniority, it did not require the granting of special privileges to
alleviate prior discrimination. A judicial modification of employ-
ment seniority would deprive white employees of their earned ex-
pectations and would amount to reverse discriminatory preference
which the Act forbade. Recognizing the fine line between a minority
employee's claim of discrimination and a countercharge of reverse
discrimination,32 the Waters court decided that on balance the
plant-wide seniority system was racially neutral and should not be
judicially modified.
Although the cases are procedurally distinguishable, '1 Waters and
30. See notes 17 & 18 supra. The company's plant-wide seniority system looked like the
type unaffected by the Act, see Clark Memorandum and Justice Memorandum, supra note
17, but upon consideration of the effects of the present system on Black employment oppor-
tunities, the court felt the general prohibitions in the Act should apply where there was a
history of past discrimination. This was particularly appropriate where seniority was the sole
criteria for awarding employment opportunities. 369 F. Supp. at 1227.
31. 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Feb. 24,
1975) (No. 1064). Waters was the first court of appeals decision on the issue of layoffs in an
employment seniority context. Laying Off Employees Pursuant to a Seniority System, 88
BNA LAB. REL. REP. No. 15, Special Pamphlet Feb. 22, 1975, at 5 [hereinafter cited as BNA
Special Pamphlet].
32. 502 F.2d at 1320.
33. Title VII issues were presented in an unusual procedural posture in Jersey Central.
The company's action for declaratory judgment did not involve alleged discriminatees and
was similar to an interpleader proceeding. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327,
IBEW, 8 FEP Cases 690, 691 (D.N.J. 1974). The company's position was necessarily inconsist-
ent; it dodged the demands of each defendant on the grounds that it was obligated to its
contract with the other. 508 F.2d at 692 n.5. The court nevertheless concluded there was a
justiciable case or controversy because defendants' competing goals, reflected in the concilia-
tion and collective bargaining agreements, caught the company in the middle. Id. at 699. For
this reason, the court's analysis began with an interpretation of the contracts. Only after
1976
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Jersey Central are aligned in the view that plant-wide seniority
systems are protected regardless of prior history of employment dis-
crimination; the Fifth Circuit has also reversed the district court in
Watkins and, with some qualifications,34 has adopted the Waters
approach. Yet other courts35 and the EEOC 31 have adopted the
determining that the contracts were not in conflict did the court consider whether Title VII
policy necessitated modification of the seniority system. Hence, the declaratory judgment
approach evaded backpay claims, which were the focus of Watkins, Waters and other employ-
ment discrimination proceedings where courts were confronted with adverse impact victims
who claimed a right directly from the Act. For discussion of the advantages and problems of
such procedurally protective avenues available to management to avoid backpay liability in
the event layoffs are subject to attack under Title VII see Stacy, supra note 2, at 517-20; BNA
Special Pamphlet, supra note 31, at 7-8.
34. See note 26 supra.
35. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Tannian, 394 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (prior sex discrim-
ination in an employment seniority system is remediable where layoffs adversely affect fem-
ales); Delay v. Carling Brewing Co., 10 FEP Cases 164 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (vestiges of discrimi-
nation in a plant-wide seniority system can be redressed by the court). See text at notes 70-
76 infra.
A grant of retroactive seniority to discriminatees has been considered an alternative to
invalidating the seniority system itself, on the theory that until past discrimination is reme-
died the system is not bona fide. See, e.g., Acha v. Beame, 44 U.S.L.W. 2398 (2d Cir. Feb.
19, 1976) (award of retroactive seniority to those who had actually been discriminated against
in hiring is remedial device and not preference because of sex); Meadows v. Ford Motor Co.,
510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975) (grant of constructive seniority as a remedy for past discrimina-
tion in hiring is not prohibited by the Act).
The validity of conferring retroactive seniority in a departmental seniority context was
considered by the Supreme Court in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 44 U.S.L.W. 4356 (U.S.
Mar. 24, 1976). The Court reversed the circuit court's denial of seniority relief to unnamed,
identifiable Black applicants denied employment after it had been determined in a class
action suit that respondent employer had engaged in racially discriminatory employment
practices which were perpetrated in the collective bargaining agreement. The Court held that
granting seniority status retroactive to the dates of employment applications of the discrimi-
natees was not barred by § 703(h), and found "clearly erroneous" the Fifth Circuit's view that
because a discriminatory refusal to hire did not affect the bona fides of the seniority system,
differences in employment conditions which a seniority system accorded employees were
protected by the Act. Moreover, the Court recognized § 703(h) does not purport to qualify or
proscribe relief otherwise appropriate under § 706(g) once an illegal discriminatory practice
is found. Id. at 4359. Since one of the central purposes of Title VII is to make persons whole
for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination, § 703(g) empowers
courts to fashion such restitutionary remedies as the particular circumstances require. See
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (to effect "make-whole" objectives of
Title VII, courts are vested with broad equitable discretion to order appropriate affirmative
action). Without an award of seniority dating from the time he was refused employment, a
discriminatee will never obtain his rightful place in the seniority hierarchy. See note 42 infra.
Thus, appropriate relief may include slotting the victim in the seniority position he would
have attained had he been hired at the time of his application. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4360-61.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell concurred with the majority analysis of § 703(h),
but in separate opinions expressed concern that the equities of innocent employees be pro-
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Watkins district court approach that a facially neutral employment
seniority system which adversely affects minority employees be-
cause of past discrimination is discriminatory itself, is not bona fide,
and is therefore remediable under the Act. The Watkins district
court approach is consistent with the response of courts to earlier
challenges to subdivided seniority systems where Blacks had been
discriminatorily relegated to the least attractive departments prior
to the Act. Courts generally have conceded that incumbent minori-
ties should be protected from facially neutral but adversely effective
departmental, job or craft restrictions after having already endured
the hardships of past discriminatory practices;37 they have empha-
sized that the Act's objective was to eliminate vestiges of discrimi-
nation. Courts adjudicating the validity of such restrictions have
clearly indicated a prima facie neutral system which carried forward
past discrimination was not necessarily bona fide, and have devel-
oped a concept of remediable discrimination which could be trans-
posed to the plant-wide seniority situation.
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc.38 was the seminal decision on the
question whether present consequences of past discrimination were
covered by Title VH. 35 In Quarles, the court was asked whether
prima facie neutral restrictive transfer policies and seniority provi-
sions in a labor agreement were unlawful employment practices if
superimposed on a departmental structure that had been organized
tected in attaining the "make whole" objective of Title VII. Id. at 4366 (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
36. See notes 72-75 and accompanying text infra.
37. United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 364 (8th Cir. 1973). For example,
where minorities were assigned to inferior positions in a subdivided system prior to Title VII,
the practice continuously foreclosed or discouraged mobility for the incumbent minority
worker; this was frequently done by promulgation of no-transfer rules or by denial of credit
for previously earned seniority once a new position was assumed. See, e.g., cases cited at notes
47-50 infra.
38. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
39. Employment practice cases under Title VII were not the first in which courts deter-
mined the validity of facially neutral practices which-carried forward past disadvantages to
Blacks. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (congressional power to
suspend literacy tests held valid since even if fairly administered, tests would freeze the
effects of past discrimination). Compare NLRB v. Local 269, IBEW, 357 F.2d 51 (3d Cir.
1966) (present discrimination found in contractual provisions which appear facially neutral
but operate unfairly because of past discrimination), with Central of Ga. Ry. v. Jones, 229
F.2d 648 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956) (segregated job lines invalidated and
advancement opportunities to be granted on an equal basis as part of duty of fair representa-
tion).
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on a racially segregated basis.40 The court noted there were no
express statements concerning the validity of departmental senior-
ity in the Act or in its legislative history. It was apparent, however,
that Congress did not intend to "freeze" an entire generation of
Blacks into discriminatory patterns that predated the Act." Thus,
a departmental seniority system that had its beginnings in racial
discrimination was not bona fide within the meaning of section
703(h).42
The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.43 ratified Quarles
and held that prima facie neutral tests and practices which had a
disparate impact on minorities would not be protected under Title
VII unless related to job capability or performance.44 In enunciating
40. 279 F. Supp. at 510.
41. Id. at 516. The same theory. has been applied to union practices. See, e.g., Local 53,
Heat & Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (order to compile objective
membership criteria and to alternate white and Black referrals for jobs until standards were
developed).
42. 279 F. Supp. at 517.
Three approaches have been suggested to the question whether Title VII requires the
elimination of differences in competitive advantages between Blacks and whites attributable
to past discrimination. The "status quo" approach requires that positions of whites and
Blacks already achieved be preserved unless there is explicit present discrimination. This
approach upholds facially neutral systems and does not inquire into past discriminatory acts.
The "freedom now" view would permit displacement of white incumbents by Blacks who
"but for" discrimination in the past, would be holding those jobs. Under the "rightful place"
theory, continued use of a hierarchy achieved in a racially restrictive system violates Title
VII. The differential is eliminated by allowing Black incumbents to bid against whites of
equal tenure on the basis of employment seniority when a vacancy exists. Incumbent Negro,
supra note 2, at 1268-75.
Prior to Quarles, courts had employed the "status quo" analysis expressed in Whitfield v.
USW Local 2708, 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959), a pre-Title VII
fair representation case. Developments, supra note 2, at 1160. Whitfield held neutral seniority
systems which froze previous racial restrictions were closed to judicial scrutiny in the absence
of present discriminatory acts. See, e.g., United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40
(N.D. Ala. 1968) ( Whitfield approach utilized in Title VII proceedings). Quarles distinguished
Whitfield because it allowed disparate treatment of Blacks on grounds of business necessity.
The Quarles decision, however, spelled the demise of the "status quo" approach to employ-
ment discrimination where facially neutral practices operated unfairly because of past dis-
crimination, and substituted a "rightful place" remedial theory which has been generally
accepted by the courts. See, e.g., Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th
Cir. 1969); Developments, supra note 2, at 1158-59.
43. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
44. The Court was asked whether employment requirements such as a high school di-
ploma or general intelligence test score were permitted by the Act if they operated to render
ineligible a disproportionate number of Blacks. Finding no demonstrable relationship be-
tween the requirements and successful performance on the job, the Court held that the
practices were violative because the objective of Congress in enacting Title VII was to
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this "business necessity" rule, the Supreme Court emphasized that
Congress directed the thrust of Title VII to the consequences of
employment practices and not simply to the motivation behind
them; the Court expressly rejected subjective intent to discriminate
as a necessary element of a violation.4" Since Griggs, business ne-
cessity has been recognized as a defense4" where employment prac-.
tices perpetuate the results of past prejudicial, restrictive treatment
of minority incumbents. However, courts have held that if a test or
practice has a differential impact on minorities, a business purpose
must be sufficiently compelling to override the impact. The chal-
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated
in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.
Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral
in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of
prior discriminatory employment practices.
Id. at 429-30.
45. Id. at 432. The Court noted the EEOC's position that only job-related tests were valid,
and acknowledged that administrative interpretations of the Act by its enforcing agency were
entitled to great deference if they reasonably treated the express will of Congress. Id. at 433-
34 & n.9. See Employment Security, supra note 2, at 4. The Court felt the EEOC interpreta-
t ion did reflect congressional intent to permit tests and other criteria for determining employ-
ment preferences, so long as factors of race, religion, nationality and sex were not among
them. The valid test evaluated the person as he would perform and not in the abstract. 401
U.S. at 434-36. See EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-
.14 (1970).
This interpretation of Title VII as a measure of discrimination in terms of effect rather than
motivation is arguably consistent with the social tenor of the time in which the Act was passed
and with its aim to alleviate minority unemployment. Moreover, other employment reform
legislation such as that concerned with child labor and maximum hours does not require
specific intent to determine liability. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 73 (1972); Cooper,
supra note 2, at 1671-75.
46. It has been argued that since Griggs did not establish a clear judicial standard for
deciding whether a practice was a business necessity, four standards of review have subse-
quently been used. The "no perpetuation" test, which renders unlawful any practice which
perpetuates the effect of pre-Act discrimination regardless of business interests served, is
rejected as inconsistent with Title VII. The "business purpose" approach, which justifies any
practice merely by showing a benefit accruing to the business absent subjective intent to
discriminate, is disqualified by Griggs. However, the "balancing" test, which weighs the
interest of business against the interests of the individual rights protected, and the "no
alternative" approach, which looks at whether there exists an equally advantageous practice
with a lesser disparate impact on minorities, are acceptable. Note, Business Necessity Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 98-102
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Business Necessity].
47. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), petition for cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (transfer rule of forfeiture of seniority had insufficient busi-
ness purpose).
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lenged practice must effectively carry out the intended purpose bet-
ter than an alternative practice with less racial effect." A "rational"
purpose is insufficient; 9 unless the practice is essential to safe, effi-
cient business operation, it will be prohibited." Avoidance of union
pressure, for example, fails to constitute a valid business necessity
where an adverse impact exists in a facially neutral practice.',
Because business necessity was difficult to prove, a facially
neutral seniority system which was not specifically protected under
section 703(h) was often struck down for carrying forward discrimi-
natory effects despite the absence of bad intent or present discrimi-
natory purpose.52 Thus, in the context of departmental seniority
systems which perpetuated prior discrimination, courts recognized
a strong policy behind Title VII, accorded it a liberal construction, 3
and felt they possessed wide discretion to model decrees which in-
sured compliance and afforded enjoyment of guaranteed rights; 4 at
the same time they acknowledged a dilemma, which became most
48. See, e.g., Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879 (6th Cir. 1973)
(limited bid system which operates to freeze the status quo is subject to judicial modification
in absence of proof of sufficient business necessity).
49. See, e.g., Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249-50 (10th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971) (employer's claims that "no transfer" rule was adopted
because of transferees' readjustment problems, difficulty of assessing seniority, and retraining
burdens were rational but not enough to satisfy business necessity rule).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971) (not
shown that departmental seniority and restricted transfer system was so essential to safety
and efficiency that it could not be modified and still protect legitimate business purpose).
51. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1971).
52. E.g., Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R.R., 483 F.2d 490, 496 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1002 (1973) (where a practice is not job-related, an "employer must scrutinize even the
steps he now takes with neutral or benevolent motives" to insure the practice does not
frustrate opportunities for minorities); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 360
(8th Cir. 1973) ("beyond cavil" that prima facie neutral practices which continue effects of
past discrimination are violative).
53. E.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1377 (5th Cir. 1974)
(whether residency requirement for remedial seniority should be imposed is within the sound
discretion of the court; since Title VII is "strong medicine," the court will not gloss it with
unwarranted limitations); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir.
1970) (statistical evidence established discrimination against Blacks as class despite failure
to establish cla;m by plaintiff for individual relief).
54. Compare United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971) (court
adopted extensive plan for eliminating discriminatory effects of seniority system, including
"red circling" wage level of transferees), with Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d
421, 428 (8th Cir. 1970) (class remedy is appropriate once discrimination is empirically estab-
lished); cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) ("once a right
and a violation have been shown, the scope of the district court's equitable powers to remedy
past wrongs is broad").
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acute in the layoff context, as to how much an employer must do to
alleviate the effects of past discrimination.55 The statutory provi-
sions provide little guidance to clarify the limits of judicial interven-
tion. While applicable sections of the Act are not necessarily contra-
dictory, they are based on inconsistent principles of individual
rights and majoritarian processes. Section 706(g)56 expressly gives.
courts discretionary power 7 to order "appropriate" affirmative ac-
tion once a violation has been demonstrated. The difficulty, how-
ever, is in determining the permissible scope of remediable discrimi-
nation.5" Section 703(a)5" contains broad language which prohibits
discriminatory employment practices, but is limited by section
703(h). Section 703(h) does not define exempted nondiscriminatory
"bona fide" systems, while section 703(j)10 prohibits preferential
treatment of any group.
In the absence of clear statutory guidelines,"' a facially neutral
practice or system which has a substantial adverse impact on a
minority group may either be found violative of Title VII or within
the section- 703(h) exemption by balancing the policy interest in
improving the economic status of minorities against the interests in
productivity and fairness to the majority workers.62 In cases con-
cerning seniority on less than a plant-wide basis, the competing
interests of productivity and majority expectations did not outweigh
55. United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 374 (8th Cir. 1973) (modification of
transfer restrictions, including "red circling" of wage level and use of full employment senior-
ity after thirty day residency in new job).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
57. E.g., Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973) (limited bid
system which perpetuated discriminatory effects was within the court's broad remedial
power).
58. See generally Stacy, supra note 2; Developments, supra note 2; Business Necessity,
supra note 46.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
60. Id. § 2000e-2(j). See note 20 supra.
61. Since the statutory language is inconsistent and therefore uninstructive in defining
the scope of remediable discrimination, courts have found it convenient to rely on their
interpretations of the legislative history of the Act to support their positions; however, be-
cause congressional statements concerning the scope of the Act were delivered before §§
703(h) and (j) were added and no Senate Judiciary Committee Report was ever made, legisla-
tive history is also not definitive. See Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. REV. 431, 444 (1966). See note 17 supra.
62. See Business Necessity, supra note 46, at 101-02; cf. Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510
F.2d 939, 949 (6th Cir. 1975) (to determine whether retroactive seniority is an appropriate
remedy, district judge should be guided by interests of workers who might be displaced and
interests of employer in retaining an experienced workforce).
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the policy interests of the Act; nevertheless, recognition that senior-
ity principles were embodied in virtually every collective bargaining
agreement in the country discouraged disruption of the traditional
procedures for making employment decisions. 3
Competing policy interests are more compelling in employment
seniority cases. The plant seniority system, unlike the subdivided
system, does not restrict opportunity for promotion; adverse effect
is solely attributable to prior discriminatory hiring practices which
make it impossible for minorities to withstand present layoffs. Judi-
cial relief alters the employment seniority system or assigns minor-
ity employees fictional seniority. The cost of frustration of white
incumbents' accrued seniority expectations-including loss of mor-
ale-becomes more significant in this context, particularly where
the alleged discriminatees cannot be identified as victims of the
original discriminatory hiring practice.64 Additionally, the creation
of super seniority, fictional or special seniority rights for minorities
must be assessed against the section 703(j) proscription of preferen-
tial treatment." Furthermore, although the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the Act expresses congressional policy on employment dis-
crimination," in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Com-
63. For example, remedial orders have included modification of subdivided systems to
allow greater mobility, use of total seniority in employment decisions concerning the discrimi-
natees, and other measures which would have minimum cost to the seniority expectations of
the majority. Compare United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973), with
United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), and United States
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
64. See, e.g., Watkins v. USW Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1975), citing Local
189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 995 (5th Cir. 1969). Cf. Cox v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 382 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. La. 1974) (proper application of principle that employment
preferences are violative because of past discrimination requires showing that individual
Blacks were deprived of seniority "by virtue of" prior discrimination).
• 65. But see Edwards, The Cost of Equality: Civil Rights During Periods of Economic
Stress, 20 LAW QUADRANGLE NoTEs, Winter 1976, at 7 [hereinafter cited as Edwards]. The
author points out that courts have frequently recognized "preferential" remedies may in fact
be "remedial"; constructive seniority is "fictional" only in the sense that other standard Title
VII remedies, such as backpay for time not actually worked, are fictional. Furthermore, while
courts have not previously condoned direct displacement of white employees, in departmental
seniority cases indirect displacement has occurred as a consequence of remedial orders.
It has also been argued that accrued seniority expectations of white employees in a plant-
wide seniority system which perpetuates discrimination of minority employees are illegiti-
mate and should not be protected since, were it not for prior exclusion of minorities, incum-
bent whites might not have obtained employment or acquired their seniority advantage.
Cooper, supra note 2, at 1605-06.
66. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) ("Title VII's strictures . . .
represent a congressional command that each employee be free from discriminatory
practices").
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munity Organization67 the Court reaffirmed the national labor pol-
icy of minimizing strife under the regime of majority rule and held
that a racial minority group's interest may be subordinated in the
interest of collective bargaining.
The three courts of appeals in Jersey Central, Watkins and
Waters were persuaded that these competing interests, considered
in light of the legislative history, mandated maintenance of the
status quo;68 they rejected the policy concept of equal treatment
articulated in the departmental seniority cases and the Watkins
district court approach. 9 Other district court decisions 70 and the
concurring opinion in Jersey Central7 reflect overriding concern
that an unqualified exemption of plant-wide seniority systems poses
too great an obstacle to employment and promotion opportunities
for minority workers. Where minorities were previously denied jobs
in a "last hired, first fired" system, present job security is seriously
undercut; this is particularly true in a long business slump. Because
newly hired minority workers cannot accrue sufficient seniority to
protect against layoff, the gains made possible in part through the
"best efforts" of employers to hire minorities under Title VII affirm-
ative action programs could be substantially eliminated.
The EEOC recently expressed this position, holding that a plant-
wide seniority system carrying forward past adverse effects did not
qualify as bona fide.72 The agency recognized that the threshold
question, as in Griggs, was whether the employment practice had a
67. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
68. See note 42 supra.
69. See Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 237-40 (1971).
The author describes the ethical choices available under anti-discrimination legislation in
terms of "equality of treatment" and "equality of achievement." Equal treatment may only
incidentally affect equal achievement; it emphasizes the negative proposition that race is not
a permissible basis for job allocation. Equal achievement emphasizes affirmative action. Cf.
United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 445 (5th Cir. 1971) (disadvantage
in job competition is not a Title VII violation per se; ascribing such an "altruistic yet impract-
ical purpose" to the legislation would be erroneous preferential treatment).
70. E.g., cases cited at note 35 supra.
71. 508 F.2d at 710-12 (Van Dusen, J., concurring).
72. Decision No. 251, 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH Empl. Prac. Dec.) 6448 (EEOC
May 8, 1975) (layoff based on "last hired, first fired" seniority system violates the Act where
it operates to exclude a disproportionate number of Blacks because of past discrimination);
see Decision No. 1447, 3 FEP Cases 391, 393 n.10 (EEOC 1971) (expressing disapproval of
dictum in Local 189 concerning the unqualified protection of plant-wide systems, since reme-
dial purposes of the Act would not be well effectuated by basing a difference in legal conse-
quences upon the thoroughness of discrimination).
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disparate impact upon a group protected by Title VII.71 Once a
significant adverse impact was shown, it could be justified only by
showing that the practice was a business necessity. In the Commis-
sion's view, the question whether any system was bona fide de-
pended upon a factual analysis of the history of the system to deter-
mine if it incorporated discriminatory employment decisions, in-
cluding restrictive hiring, of the past.74 This analysis applied only
where past discrimination was reflected in the seniority; it could be
distinguished from the treatment of a bona fide system which, de-
spite any disproportionate impact on minorities, would be protected
because effects of past discrimination had either been eliminated or
had never existed. 5 Only in the former was there a duty to rectify
competitive disadvantages. 6
Despite the EEOC's liberal interpretation of the scope of remedia-
ble discrimination, a broad prima facie exemption of plant-wide
seniority may be consistent with the underlying assumption of
American labor relations that industrial accord and employee pro-
tection are best accomplished through the majoritarian process of
collective bargaining. In this process, individual interests are subor-
dinate to those of the majority77-and the seniority principle is
deeply ingrained in the collective bargaining process. Although sen-
iority rights are not vested but are mere expectations, '7 they allow
73. Decision No. 251, 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH Empl. Prac. Dec.) 6448, at 4192-
93 (EEOC May 8, 1975). The EEOC held the fact that the employment practice complained
of was a layoff did not render the Griggs analysis inapplicable, particularly since seniority is
not considered a job-related criterion. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791,
796-98 (4th Cir. 1971).
74. Decision No. 251, 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH Empl. Prac. Dec.) 6448, at 4193
(EEOC May 8, 1975).
75. Id. at 4194 & n.4. See Stacy, supra note 2, at 512.
76. Applying a similar analysis in Delay v. Carling Brewing Co., 10 FEP Cases 164 (N.D.
Ga. 1974), the district court held affirmative action was required to eliminate vestiges of pre-
Act discrimination in an employment seniority system where, because of belated hiring of
Blacks, a layoff and subsequent recall based on employment seniority would make it impossi-
ble for Blacks to become eligible for full-time employment before the brewery ceased to do
business.
77. Cf. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 68-69
(1975) (substantive right to be free of racial discrimination cannot be pursued at the expense
of the orderly collective bargaining process).
78. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 44 U.S.L.W. 4356, 4365 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976)
("[this Court has long held that employee expectations arising from a seniority system
agreement may be modified by statutes furthering a strong public policy interest") (footnote
omitted); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (collective bargaining agreement
may enhance seniority status of certain employees for purposes of furthering public policy
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each employee reasonably to assess his prospects for job retention
and advancement while minimizing arbitrary, discretionary treat-
ment by both the employer and the union.7" Certainly, Title VII
concerns individual rights to equal employment rather than majori-
tarian process; arguably, by passage of the Act Congress implicitly
assumed the minority employee could not obtain a just resolution
of his predicament through majority rule.8 Yet the Act also indi-
cates employees are protected from preferential treatment of any
group. Thus, while Title VII allows modification of majoritarian
expectations if necessary, it has been suggested that universal
judicial modification of plant-wide seniority systems pursuant to
Title VII would cause industrial chaos."'
Under this analysis, it is not surprising that courts have been
reluctant to rule that prima facie neutral employment seniority sys-
tems are not bona fide. Perhaps one further reason for the circuit
courts' acceptance of plant-wide seniority systems is the absence of
agency guidelines as to what might replace a seniority practice
based on total service once a disproportionate impact on minorities
in a layoff has been demonstrated." The company's action for decla-
interests despite detrimental effect on expectations acquired by other employees under pre-
vious seniority agreement). See Cooper, supra note 2, at 1605.
79. See note 2 supra.
80. Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles and Its Implications,
47 TEXAS L. REV. 1039, 1073 (1969).
81. A judicial statement that a Title VII violation occurs in the context of plant-wide
seniority due to adverse impact caused by prior hiring discrimination would be an extraordi-
nary policy decision, especially during an economic low period. See Employment Security,
supra note 2, at 8. Few union or political leaders support the idea of a statutory remedy of
seniority modification, since it would be detrimental to majority workers with greater actual
seniority who have been able to tolerate the effects of high unemployment. See Edwards,
supra note 65, at 8-10.
82. The authority of the EEOC to issue guidelines and interpretations of the Act was
upheld in American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 1100 (D.D.C.
1968), aff'd, 59 CCH Lab. Cas. 9203 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Judicial deference to reasonable
agency guidelines has been confirmed by the Supreme Court. See note 45 supra. But see
Business Necessity, supra note 46, at 112-13 n.64 (EEOC is recognized as advocate for greater
minority utilization in employment and therefore is unreliable to assist courts in effectuating
the intent of Title VII). Cf. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973) (judicial
deference to agency's interpretation has limits where there is compelling indication it is
wrong).
As early as March, 1975, the EEOC was reportedly in the process of drafting guidelines
designed to resolve conflicts in layoff procedures between union seniority provisions and equal
employment requirements under Title VII. The guidelines were to prohibit layoffs that would
result in a disparate impact on minorities and to require as alternatives other cost-reducing
measures such as eliminating overtime and paid holidays, reducing hours uniformly, and
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ratory judgment in Jersey Central suggests it faced such a dilemma.
A court that refuses to limit its perception of employment dis-
crimination by unqualifiedly accepting an employment or plant-
wide system as bona fide raises the spectre of preferential treat-
ment. Minority protection and affirmative actions as expressed in
Title VII were designed to facilitate the development of an inte-
grated, equally protected workforce. Until the Supreme Court pre-
scribes the limits of these minority safeguards, the scope of the
commitment to root out effects of past discrimination to accomplish
this end will remain unclear.
Phoebe Haddon Northcross
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE PRO-
CESS-STATE PREJUDGMENT GARNISHMENT STATUTE-The Supreme
Court of the United States has held the due process requirements
of the United States Constitution were not satisfied by a state stat-
ute which permitted issuance of a prejudgment writ of garnishment
on the basis of conclusory allegations made in an ex parte proceed-
ing without judicial participation and which afforded the alleged
debtor's interest in the property no protection other than provisions
for posting bond and counterbond.
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975).
Respondent Di-Chem, Inc. filed suit in the Superior Court of
Whitfield County, Georgia, alleging an indebtedness due for goods
sold and delivered to petitioner. The same day, respondent filed a
shutting down plants on certain days. Where layoffs represented the only feasible option, the
guidelines suggested employers seek volunteers to take temporary leave on a rotating basis.
88 BNA LAB. REL. REP. 216-17 (1975). Further reports, however, indicated the EEOC had
postponed its decision to issue guideline§ until they were evaluated by other federal civil
rights enforcement agencies. Id. at 253. In April, 1975, commissioners of the EEOC voted to
defer action on the proposed guidelines since, according to EEOC sources, other agencies had
opposed the EEOC approach. Id. at 313.
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